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Abstract 
We extend the empirical literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) by showing the legal origin matters for 
the evolution of environmental quality. Using observations of ambient sulfur dioxide levels, we find that the EKC for 
French and British legal origin countries diverge as incomes rise, with the EKC for French legal origin countries lying 
significantly below that for countries of British legal origin. This finding is robust to the inclusion of proxies for 
democracy and corruption, the institutional variables emphasized in the current EKC literature. Our results are 
consistent with the idea that the British common law tradition places a greater emphasis on private relative to collective 
property rights.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Beginning with the seminal work of Grossman and Krueger (1995), a substantial empirical 
literature investigates the relationship between environmental quality and economic 
development.  The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, reviewed by Dinda (2004), 
holds that the level of pollution follows an inverted-U pattern as rising incomes increase the 
demand for environmental quality.  As Arrow et al. (1995, p. 520) have pointed out, the falling 
portion of the EKC does not occur automatically but rather depends on “institutional reforms … 
[that] compel private users of environmental resources to take account of their actions.”  Recent 
empirical work confirms this argument, finding an important role for democracy and corruption 
in determining the relationship between income and environmental quality, e.g. Farzin and Bond 
(2006), Gallagher and Thacker (2008), and Cole (2007).  We add to the literature on institutions 
and the EKC by presenting evidence that the origin of a country’s legal system plays a role in the 
evolution of environmental quality.   
The literature on legal origin, reviewed by La Porta et al. (2008), finds that the legal 
system plays a critical role in the regulation of economic activity, including the regulation of 
entry, labor markets, financial contracts, and court proceedings.  A central distinction in this 
literature is that between the British common law and the French civil law traditions, both of 
which have global significance due to colonial transplantation.  In empirical work, the French 
civil law tradition tends to be associated with greater intensity of regulation, lower levels of 
financial development, and higher levels of corruption, unemployment and informality.   
Beck et al. (2003) identify two channels through which the common law-civil law 
distinction may influence regulation, with different implications for the shape of the EKC.  
According to the political channel, emphasized by La Porta et al. (1998), the  common law 
tradition places greater weight on the protection of private property rights, providing a 
counterweight to potential government overreach.  As related by Beck et al. (2003), following 
the French revolution, the state sought to reform what was seen as a corrupt and anti-democratic 
legal system by reducing the independence of the courts and strengthening the role of the central 
government.  In contrast, the British  courts sided with Parliament and land owners in their 
struggle with the Crown, maintained greater independence and emerged as a champion of private 
property rights.  As applied to the regulation of environmental quality, the political channel 
implies that the EKC should be higher in common law countries due to their greater emphasis on 
private relative to collective property rights.   
  According to the  adaptability channel, emphasized by Hayek (1960), the primary 
difference in these legal traditions is that the common law legal tradition places greater reliance 
judge-made law, allowing the courts to serve as an independent  source of legal innovation.  
Theoretical considerations suggest that the evolution of common law jurisprudence is likely to 
favor increased environmental quality, at least to the degree that this is in keeping with economic 
efficiency.  In part this is because the primary vehicle for common law environmental litigation – 
the nuisance doctrine – requires the court to weigh the social costs and benefits of the offending 
conduct in reaching a judgment (Brown and Meiners, 2000).  Moreover, as argued by Rubin 
(1982), because litigation is costly, disputes involving efficient law are more likely to be settled 
out of court rather than litigated.  As a result, legal innovation tends to be concentrated on areas 
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of inefficient law, such that the general direction of legal innovation is toward greater 
efficiency.
1
  In contrast, the civil law tradition rejects a central role for jurisprudence as a source of 
legal innovation and relies instead on statutory law, which tends to be both costly and slow to 
change in response to evolving economic conditions (Bailey and Rubin, 1994).  Moreover, the 
combination of diffuse benefits and concentrated costs to pollution reduction suggests the 
potential for significant political market failure with respect to attempts to legislate 
environmental quality (Olson, 1965).  Together, these considerations suggest that the common 
law  tradition  may be more responsive to changing preferences and emerging conflicts over 




  To the best of our knowledge Di Vita (2009) is the only other paper to address legal 
origin as a determinant of environmental quality.  Di Vita’s approach differs from ours in that he 
focuses on the indirect relationship between legal origin and environmental quality that operates 
through the level of financial development and tests for a linear, rather than quadratic, 
relationship between these variables.   
   
 
2.  Empirical Model, Data and Results 
 
We test the role of legal origin using the following empirical model:   
 
2
01 2 ** , it i i it i it it it pollution LO LO income LO income X β β β φε = + + ++  
 
where  it pollution is a measure of pollution per capita in country i and year t,  it income  is the 
natural log of real income per capita (PPP),  i LO  is a dummy variable for a country’s legal 
origin, t year  is the year of the observation,  it X is a vector of control variables and  it ε is the error 
term.  This specification allows legal origin to influence all three coefficients in the quadratic 
relationship between income and pollution that characterizes the EKC.  We control for country-
specific heterogeneity by employing a random effects estimator, since this allows us to estimate 
the influence of legal origin on the intercept of the EKC.   
  We test the role of legal origin using annual national observations of the ambient level of 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) per capita from Stern (2005).  We chose sulfur dioxide as our measure of 
pollution because it is available for a broad sample of countries and years and is well-known to 
follow an EKC pattern.  In addition to legal origin, we consider two measures of institutional 
quality,  polity2, a measure of democracy  from the Polity IV  database, and freedom from 
corruption, a measure of property rights protection from the ICRG database, rescaled 0-1, which  
                                                 
1According to the Coase theorem, in the absence of transaction costs the allocation of property rights does not affect 
efficiency.  However, environmental quality is typically both non-excludable and non-rival, implying that private 
contracting will tend to be subject to significant measurement, coordination, information and enforcement costs and, 
thus, that the allocation of environmental property rights matters.   
2 The relative flexibility of the common law legal system is evident when legislative authorities are slow or reluctant 
to act.  For example, Rosen (2007, p. 314) argues that environmental litigation “played the role of change-driver” in 
the Jersey City meatpacking industry, “filling a void left by the failure of state and local governments.”  Similarly, 
Grad and Rocket (1970) note that the decision in United States vs. Standard Oil Company extended the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 to encompass modern water pollution and, thereby, obviated the need for legislative action.   
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
lny  1813  7.43  1.66  4.13  10.94 
lnso2cap  1813  1.78  1.36  -2.63  6.03 
population density  1813  0.97  3.07  0.00  30.94 
British  1813  0.41  0.49  0  1 
year  1813  1990  6.05  1980  2000 
polity2  1729  1.42  7.28  -10  10 
freedom from corruption  1082  0.59  0.22  0  1 
 
is available starting in 1984.  Legal origin, real per capita income (PPP), and population density 
are from the Global Development Network Database.  The dummy variable British takes on a 
value of 1 for British legal origin countries and zero otherwise.  We restrict attention to countries 
of French and British legal origin.   
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  We have observations on income levels and 
pollution for 90 countries over the period from 1980 to 2000, though our measures of democracy 
and property rights are available for smaller samples.  Roughly 40% of our observations are from 
British legal origin countries.
3
  Table 2 presents our results.  In column one, we confirm that the pollution-income path 
follows an inverted-U pattern for our sample when institutional variables are omitted.  Next, we 
introduce the three interaction terms for British legal origin.  Since French legal origin is the 
omitted category, the EKC for French legal origin countries is given by the first three rows.  
Note that each of these coefficients is significant at the 1% level, indicating that SO2 levels 
follow an EKC pattern for French legal origin countries.  Note also that all three coefficients for 
British legal origin are significant at the 1% level, indicating that legal origin plays a statistically 
significant role in the evolution of environmental quality.  As seen in columns three and four, the 
pattern of coefficient magnitudes and significance is similar when we control for democracy and 
freedom from corruption.  Finally, using a Hausman specification test, we are unable to reject the 
hypothesis that the random effects estimates in column four are consistent, p = 0.9998.   
  British legal origin is positively and significantly correlated with 
democracy, 0.0570, and freedom from corruption, 0.1153.   
To simplify the interpretation of our findings, we illustrate the EKC curves for French 
and British legal origin countries in Figure 1 using the coefficient estimates from column four.  
First, we note that the two income-pollution paths are quite similar at lower income levels and 
begin to diverge at a per capita income level of around $1,000  ≈  e
7.  The divergence of these 
paths at higher income levels is consistent with the argument that a society’s institutional 
framework affects how it responds to increases in the demand for environmental quality.  By the 
                                                 
3 There are 55 countries in the sample that have a French legal origin:  Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, 
Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., 
Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Venezuela.  
There are 35 countries in the sample with a British legal origin:  Australia, Bahrain, Bermuda, Bhutan, Botswana, 
Canada, Fiji, Ghana, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
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Table 2:  SO2 and Legal Origin 
 
        (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








WE region and  
French legal origin 
omitted 
RE  
WE region and  
French legal 
origin omitted 
  lnso2cap  lnso2cap  lnso2cap  lnso2cap 
constant  38.491  30.467  32.169  15.495 
  (7.56)***  (5.79)***  (7.30)***  (3.42)*** 
income  1.442  3.018  2.250  3.602 
  (3.69)***  (7.25)***  (5.51)***  (6.35)*** 
income2  -0.072  -0.184  -0.127  -0.216 
  (2.89)***  (6.28)***  (4.38)***  (5.49)*** 
British    7.592  5.315  5.188 
    (3.74)***  (2.70)***  (2.27)** 
income*British    -2.141  -1.447  -1.656 
    (3.90)***  (2.65)***  (2.58)*** 
income2*British    0.154  0.104  0.132 
    (4.13)***  (2.75)***  (2.95)*** 
polity 2      0.007  0.005 
      (3.64)***  (2.01)** 
freedom from corruption        0.310 
        (5.27)*** 
population density  0.067  0.062  0.053  0.029 
  (4.78)***  (4.80)***  (4.89)***  (2.07)** 
year  -0.022  -0.020  -0.020  -0.014 
  (9.84)***  (8.91)***  (9.88)***  (6.98)*** 
regions  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1813  1813  1729  1048 
Number of countries  90  90  86  63 
Hausman        p = 0.9998 
Turning point income level   All = $22,335 
 
FR = $3,645 
BR = $2,228,115 
FR = $7,032 
BR = $38,130,374 
FR = $4,180 
BR = $107,295 
income2 + 
income2*British = 0 
  p = 0.6776  p = 0.7350  p = 0.1102 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Robust z statistics in parentheses.   
 
same argument, these paths should be similar at low levels of per capita income when the 
demand for environmental quality is low.  Second, our finding that the level of pollution is lower 
for French legal origin countries is consistent with the political channel perspective that common 
law countries place greater emphasis on private relative to collective property rights.  Third, the 
French EKC has a turning point that lies in the middle income range, while the British EKC is 
nearly linear, a finding that stands in direct opposition to the claim that the common law system 
is more adaptable and responsive to changing economic conditions.  
The penultimate row of Table 2 reports estimated turning point income levels by legal 
origin.  These estimates confirm that the inclusion of legal origin has a significant effect on the 
shape of the estimated EKC.  In particular, our results from the first regression, in which we do 
not account for legal origin, imply that the estimated turning point income level is $22,335.   
 
2972Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 2968-2974
 




Relative to our results from columns two through four, this estimate dramatically overstates the 
turning point income level for French legal origin countries and dramatically understates the 
turning point income level for British legal origin countries.  These regressions consistently 
identify the turning point for French legal origin countries as lying in the middle income range.  
In contrast, our estimate of the turning point income level for British legal origin countries is 
highly unstable.  Indeed, as reported in the final row of Table 2, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the British EKC is linear.   
While our results are broadly consistent with the political channel, they contrast with the 
finding  of  Beck et al. (2003) that the adaptability channel matters more for financial 
development, and this contrast raises the question of whether the primary channel of influence 
depends on the nature of the activity being regulated.  In particular, the adaptability channel 
holds that private litigation plays a central role in legal evolution, but private litigation may 
matter less for nonpoint source forms of pollution, like SO2, for which it is difficult to identify 
damages with a specific polluter.  By this argument, private litigation may play a greater role in 
the evolution of point source pollution, such as many types of water pollution.  This issue is not 
resolved by our investigation and remains an important question for future research in this area.   
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
This is the first paper to consider the relationship between legal origin and the shape of the 
environmental Kuznets curve.  Using a panel of annual observations of ambient sulfur dioxide 
levels for 90 countries, we find that legal origin plays a statistically significant role in 
determining the shape of the EKC for SO2.  In particular, while the income-pollution paths of 
common and civil law countries are similar at lower income levels, they diverge at higher 
income levels, with levels of pollution and a turning point income level that are significantly 
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lower for French legal origin countries.  These findings are robust to controls for the levels of 
democracy and corruption, the measures of institutional quality emphasized in the existing 
literature on the EKC.   
Our results are consistent with earlier research on legal origin that finds that the civil law 
tradition is associated with greater regulation; however, we differ from the existing literature in 
one important respect.  Most work in this area has found that the civil law tradition is associated 
high social costs in the form of higher unemployment rates, greater corruption, more protracted 
and costly court proceedings, and a greater share of informal economic activity.  While we 
present no evidence regarding the optimal level of  SO2 emissions at different levels of 
development, it is at least possible that the lower levels of pollution observed in middle and 
upper income civil law countries is associated with higher welfare.  
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